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Abstract
In this article, the author focuses on the relationship between political actors and the 
mass media. The author uses media frames as dependent variables and investigates 
the factors that influence the presence and frequency of frames applied by journalists 
(the frames in “news media”). This has come to be known as frame building. The author 
argues that there are at least three important factors in frame building: power, the 
salience of the frames in the media input, and the multiplication effect of the minister. 
Using data from content analyses of campaign material and news media and from 
interviews with political actors, the author finds support that for frame presence, 
power is important. For frame frequency, the salience of the frames in the media input 
and the minister are crucial.
Keywords
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Under contemporary conditions with the media as a key intermediary between politi-
cal actors and citizens, the chain of communication from the political actors to the 
voters is essentially a multistep process that includes the flow of frames from the 
political actors to the journalists and from the journalists to the voters. The step 
between the political actors to the journalists is called frame building (Scheufele, 
1999). Frame building uses media frames as dependent variable and investigates the 
factors that influence the creation or changes of frames applied by journalists (frames 
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in news media or media frames). Media frames refer to the arguments, words, or 
images that journalists use when relaying information about an issue to an audience 
(see Gerth & Siegert, 2011). They are defined as working routines for journalists, 
which “organize the world both for journalists who report it and, in some important 
degree, for us who rely on their reports” (Gitlin, 1980, p. 7).1 A news media frame 
“organizes everyday reality” (Tuchman, 1978, p. 193) by providing “meaning to an 
unfolding strip of events” (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987, p. 143; 1989). The term 
frame building is borrowed from the concept of “agenda building,” which was intro-
duced by Cobb and Elder (1971, p. 905) and is concerned with “how issues are created 
and why some controversies or incipient issues come to command the attention and 
concern of decision makers, while others fail” (see also Scheufele, 2000, p. 303). 
Whereas agenda building (e.g., Brandenburg, 2002) is concerned with the issue level, 
frame building looks at the different dimensions or aspects of the same issue. In com-
munication science, frame building is also called “second-level agenda building” (e.g. 
Kiousis, Mitrook, Wu, & Seltzer, 2006) and is concerned with the salience of issue-
specific attributes in the media.
The factors that influence media frames have been largely neglected so far. Most 
studies have been concerned with the production and selection of news (e.g., Gans, 
1979; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Tuchman, 1978). “To turn the concept into a viable 
research avenue, future research should specify the conditions under which frames 
emerge” (De Vreese, 2005, p. 60). In this regard, Ferree at al. (2002, p. 296) state that 
“the relative roles of parties and movements in taking leadership roles in framing 
issues in the media is an important and understudied aspect.” By exclusively focusing 
on framing and the effects of framing on public opinion or on voters (see, for instance, 
Schemer, Wirth, & Matthes, 2011), the whole question of how frames originate is 
sidestepped. Because it has largely been neglected so far, this article focuses on frame 
building and identifies key factors.
Key Factors of Frame Building
My general approach for conceptualizing the relationship between political actors and 
the media is an actor-centered political process model, as introduced by Wolfsfeld 
(1997). Following Wolfsfeld’s lead, I believe that the best way to understand the role 
of the news media is to view it as part of a larger contest among political antagonists 
for the control of the public agenda and the public’s interpretation of specific policy 
issues. Such a viewpoint also has been recommended by public relation scholars: 
“Researchers would add significantly to the public relations body of knowledge sim-
ply by focusing their studies from the standpoint of the source” (Zoch & Molleda, 
2006, p. 302). Given the crucial role of the news media for reaching out to the citizen 
public, the struggle for attention and for the meaning of political issues becomes a 
struggle for the control of the news agenda and for the framing of the news. The rela-
tionship between the political actors and the news media is one of mutual dependence: 
The political actors need the media to reach the public, whereas the media need the 
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input from the political actors for their news production. As Wolfsfeld (1997, p. 13) 
puts it, their relationship is one of a “competitive symbiosis . . . in which each side of 
the relationship attempts to exploit the other while expending a minimum amount of 
costs.” Or, as Gans (1979, p. 116) pointed out in an often-cited quote, “the relationship 
between sources and journalists resembles a dance, for sources seek access to journal-
ists, and journalists seek access to sources.” But, significantly, Gans went on to stress 
that this relationship was likely to be an asymmetrical one, too: “Although it takes two 
to tango, either sources or journalists can lead, but more often than not, sources do the 
leading.” Wolfsfeld’s (1997, p. 3) key hypothesis makes the same point: The political 
process is likely to be the driving force in this relationship. The reasons he provides 
for this hypothesis are numerous, but, most importantly, he suggests that the news 
media are much more likely to react to political events than to initiate them. The 
hypothesis has been supported by empirical results. Findings from public relation 
research have indicated that “PR messages are the cause and media content the effect” 
(Froehlich & Rüdiger, 2006, p. 24). It seems that public relations efforts are meaning-
ful in triggering media coverage (Kiousis et al., 2006). For direct-democratic cam-
paigns, it has been shown that political actors take the lead in frame building. The 
framing by the political actors significantly influences the framing by the media, 
whereas the reverse does not apply (Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010).
Thus, it is the political actors who introduce the most important frames into the 
public discourse. Now, I want to look at the processes more in detail and identify key 
factors of frame building. I conceptually distinguish between frame presence (= non-
absence), on one hand, and frame frequency, on the other. There are not the same fac-
tors behind, as I will explain below. In a similar way, Tresch (2009) defines two 
dimensions of standing: presence and prominence. The key factors in frame building 
are derived from research in agenda building, media attention, and political 
communication.
Key Factor for Frame Presence: Power of  
the Political Organization
The key factor for frame presence is the power of the political organizations that pro-
mote a frame. This idea is based on numerous studies that have shown that media 
attention is biased toward the more powerful actors (e.g., Entman, 2007; Gans, 1979; 
Wolfsfeld, 1997) and that powerful actors have preferential access to the media 
(Danielian & Page, 1994).2 Furthermore the idea is supported by the so-called “index-
ing hypothesis,” which predicts that “mass media news professionals . . . tend to 
‘index’ the range of voices and viewpoints . . . according to the range of views 
expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic” (Bennett, 1990, 
p. 106). Accordingly, the frames of the weak actors will less likely be covered. I call 
this the power bias hypothesis.
The power of an organization is not conceived as responsible for frame frequency 
in the news media. Only the frames of prominent people such as the minister 
 at University of Zurich on January 25, 2012abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
4  American Behavioral Scientist XX(X) 
responsible for the issue (or the president) are expected to get higher attention. 
Prominent figures have an advantage that does not hold for powerful organizations in 
general. In this respect, it is important to note that, for both camps, power is measured 
(see below) at the organizational level (not at the personal level). In addition, power is 
defined as having influence in the background or/and in the foreground. The organiza-
tions that are influential behind the scenes are not necessarily known in public. 
Sometimes they are even more influential because they stay incognito for the public. 
Thus, their frames cannot be expected to be covered disproportionately more.
Key Factors for Frame Frequency
Salience of Frames in Media Input
The salience of the frame(s) in the media input, that is, the frequency with which the 
frame(s) are mentioned in the media input of the political actor, is crucial for frame 
frequency in the news coverage. This expectation is in line with studies of agenda 
building, which have confirmed that the salience of issues in the media input is posi-
tively related to the salience of issues in news media (Kiousis et al., 2006; Wirth 
et al., 2010). Furthermore, in Western democracies, the neutral-informational profes-
sional journalism is dominant (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Based on this neutral-
informational journalistic norm, the media should give an accurate account of 
important events, actors, and messages within the institutionalized arenas of the 
political system and make the political process transparent for the citizen public. In 
other words, the journalists are expected to disseminate information as neutral 
chroniclers and impartial observers. This norm is in line with the mirror approach, 
which conceives of the media as a mirror of political reality (e.g., McQuail, 1992; 
Schulz, 1976). Thus, the media are assumed to report the frames proportionally to the 
degree to which they are promoted (= frequency with which they are mentioned in 
the media input). I call this the salience hypothesis.
The salience of a frame in the media input is not crucial for frame presence because 
weak political organizations can make a great effort; they still do not earn media cov-
erage, and their frames remain absent in the debate. Furthermore, direct-democratic 
campaigns are covered so prominently that the salience of a promoted frame does not 
make a difference for whether a frame is present in the news. In other words, all frames 
promoted by a powerful organization earn media coverage, not only the most impor-
tant frame.
The Role of the Minister or the President
The messages of the minister or, in general, of very prominent institutional speakers 
of a debate such as the president in the United States, are expected to be met with 
higher response by the media than the messages of the other actors. I call this expec-
tation the multiplication hypothesis. By minister, I am referring to federal councilor. 
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The Federal Council is the Swiss government, which has seven members. Federal 
councilors are confronted with a double task: They are members of the governing 
college, and they direct one of the seven federal ministries (Kriesi & Trechsel, 2008). 
Both the prominence and prestige of this actor are expected to increase the news value 
of a frame promoted by him or her (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Schulz, 1976; Price & 
Tewksbury, 1997). Accordingly, the minister responsible for the proposition submitted 
to the vote is expected to influence frame frequency. This is also in line with what 
campaigners reported in interviews: The minister is not forced to campaign. It seems 
that journalists are awaiting the minister’s statements: Whenever the minister speaks, 
microphones are switched, on and journalists report extensively about her or his view. 
No other actor enjoys such an advantage. For reasons of generalizability, one could 
think of an influence factor such as “prominence” instead of “minister” (or the presi-
dent). In any case, it should be noted that “power” and “minister”/“prominence” is not 
the same. The former is measured at the organizational level, whereas the latter is a 
personal characteristic. Frame frequency is depending on whether a frame is spon-
sored by such prominent figures as the minister. It is not depending on the power of 
the organization. Minister status is not responsible for frame presence, because many 
powerful actors other than ministers promote their frames and earn coverage. In other 
words, access to the media in direct-democratic campaigns is not restricted to the 
minister or very prominent figures but to powerful organizations in general.
Hypotheses
In summary, the hypotheses are as follows: First, the power bias hypothesis states that 
powerful organizations get easier access to the media with their frames than weak 
actors. Second, the salience of the frames in the media input is crucial for its frequency 
in the media (salience hypothesis). Third, the minister’s or the president’s frames are 
multiplied more than the frames of the other actors (multiplication hypothesis).
Finally, external events taking place during the campaign can be relevant with 
regard to frame building as well. Lawrence (2000) argues that high-profile media cov-
erage of unplanned events provide a special opportunity for reframing. The same has 
been shown by Baumgartner, De Boef, & Boydstund (2008), where unexpected and 
scandalous events in and around the death penalty debate in the United States have 
triggered a shift in the existing debate towards the innocence frame. Also, banalities 
such as summer or Christmas holidays structure the debate.
Context of the Study
This article studies frame building in the context of a political campaign dealing with 
the issue of immigration in Switzerland. On June 1, 2008, the naturalization initiative 
of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) was voted down by 63.6% of the voters. The clarity 
of this verdict came as a big surprise and constituted a conspicuous defeat for the SVP, 
for whom this vote had been the most important test of its new opposition politics. The 
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party had won the federal elections in fall 2007, but it had lost the fight for the compo-
sition of the governmental coalition in December 2007: Its coalition partners had 
respected its claim for two out of the total of seven governmental seats, but they had 
not complied with the party’s demand to reelect both of its incumbent ministers. Instead 
of the party’s charismatic leader Christoph Blocher—the incumbent minister of justice, 
Parliament had chosen another member of the party—Evelyne Widmer-Schlumpf—to 
replace him. It was essentially a coalition of Social Democrats and Christian Democrats 
that had unseated the SVP leader. As a reaction to the ousting of its leader, the SVP 
proceeded to exclude its two newly elected ministers from the party and decided to 
adopt a systematic oppositional stance. The exclusion procedure preoccupied the SVP 
and the Swiss public right up to the vote on the naturalization initiative, which explains 
why the campaign for the initiative began rather late, just 5 weeks before the vote. This 
vote provided the first important test for the party’s new overall strategy.
To understand the thrust of the SVP’s initiative for “democratic naturalizations,” 
one needs to be aware that local municipalities play a key role in the naturalization 
process in Switzerland. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that naturalization 
has never been a completely administrative procedure in this country, but has always 
involved political elements as well. Prior to a decree by the Federal Court in 2003, 
such a decision could even have been taken by popular votes at the ballot box. In reac-
tion to an infamous vote in the city of Emmen, where a series of applicants for Swiss 
citizenship from the former Yugoslavia had been denied Swiss citizenship in a popular 
vote, the federal judges decided to outlaw such popular votes on naturalizations. They 
argued that the rejection of naturalization requests required a justification and that 
such a justification was not possible in a direct-democratic vote. The popular vote had 
only been used in a limited number of places, but it could be shown that, in these 
places, the rejection rate of naturalization applicants was much higher than in the rest 
of Switzerland (Helbling & Kriesi, 2004).
It was in reaction to this decision by the Federal Court that the SVP launched its 
popular initiative in 2004. The initiative proposed that the voters in a given municipal-
ity should be able to decide which kind of procedure they wanted for naturalizations—
in particular, whether they wanted to vote at the ballot box on individual naturalizations. 
Moreover, the initiative stipulated that it should not be possible to appeal against local 
rejections of naturalization requests. The initiative, in fact, demanded that the act of 
naturalization should become an exclusively political act of the citizens as sovereign.
The government rejected the initiative, arguing above all that it violated international 
law, in particular the European Convention on Human Rights, the UN Pact II, and the 
UN Convention against Racism. The debate in Parliament on the initiative was rather 
controversial, because several members of the moderate right felt a good deal of sym-
pathy for the proposal. Eventually, the Parliament decided by a clear majority to reject 
the initiative. However, it provided the populist right with a substantial concession by 
elaborating an indirect counterproposal to the initiative in the form of a modification of 
the law on civic rights: This proposal stipulated that naturalizations in general local 
assemblies should still be possible. A rejection of a naturalization request should, 
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however, only be possible on the basis of a request providing explicit justifications, 
which was to be introduced during the assembly and that could serve as the basis of a 
possible later appeal. In the event that the initiative should be rejected, this counterpro-
posal was to enter into force. In this case, the parliamentary and the direct-democratic 
debate slightly varied. In the Parliament, they were mainly concerned about the proce-
dure they wanted for naturalization. The contra camp asked for fair procedures that 
complied with basic rights (“rule of law”), whereas the pro side conceived naturaliza-
tions as political acts and not as administrative ones and claimed that people should 
have the final say (“people final say”). In the direct-democratic phase, the pro camp 
additionally argued that “mass naturalizations” had to be stopped (also see for these 
frames Gerth & Siegert, 2011; Hänggli & Kriesi, 2011; Matthes, 2011; Schemer et al., 
2011; Wettstein, 2011).
Methods
I rely on the content analysis of all the campaign material produced by the political 
actors for communication with the media—input for earned media coverage (“media 
input”: press releases, speeches from media conferences, or public statements), as 
well as on the content analysis of the media’s news reporting (“news media”). This 
material was coded with the same codebook on a daily basis for the three months prior 
to the vote. I also call the frames in the media input the “promoted frames.” For the 
media’s news reporting, I selected the 24 most important newspapers of the German 
and French parts of the country, based on the highest total audience. In addition, I also 
analyzed the most important news and political information programs of the public 
television stations in the two parts of the country.3
Operationalization
Power is operationalized by a reputation indicator and is based on a set of questions 
referring to the list of all organizations involved (Kriesi, Adam, & Jochum, 2006). The 
campaigners were interviewed twice. In the second interview, they were first asked to 
name the organizations on the list that, from their point of view, had been particularly 
influential (in the background and/or in public) during the campaign. Next, they were 
asked to name the three most influential organizations and, finally, the most influential 
one. For each actor, a summary indicator reflects the number of times he or she was 
mentioned by the other respondents in reaction to these questions: mentions as “most 
influential” are coded as 3, mentions among the “three most influential” as 2, and 
mentions as “influential” as 1. The values of the indicator range from 0, for an orga-
nization that was never mentioned as influential, to 3 times the number of respon-
dents, for an organization that would have been considered to be the most influential 
actor by all of them. In a next step, the sum of daily power of the two sides is built. 
The sum of daily power is measured for both camps separately and corresponds to the 
total amount of power of the organizations that promote a given frame on a certain 
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day. For example, two actors of the pro camp hold a media conference together while 
no other actor of their camp is active on this day. Actor A is a powerful actor who 
scores 86 on the power measure, whereas actor B reaches only a score of 18. Together, 
they arrive at 104 points, the sum of daily power of the pro camp. Alternatively, one 
could have used the mean or median of the power of the actors involved. The results 
show little change if power is operationalized differently. It is important to note that 
power measures the perception of the political actors, and possibly, powerful actors 
were powerful in the background. More common measures of power such as the 
numbers of seats in Parliament or number of members were not use because I deal 
with different actor types like parties, economic interest groups, citizens’ interest 
groups, authorities, and committees. There is no common power measure that could 
be applied to all these actor types. Power correlates very highly with the actors’ 
degrees of centrality (correlation = .85 for nongovernmental actors4) and correlates 
highly with money that has been spent beyond the operating expenditures in the cam-
paign (correlation = .71 for nongovernmental actors) or with personnel, a composite 
index that takes into account both staff members (workload in terms of full-time 
equivalent) and the approximate number of used volunteers deployed (correlation = 
.63 for nongovernmental actors) (see also Bernhard 2011).
I will measure the salience of a frame in the media input with the number of argu-
ments in which a frame is used in the media input and a dummy indicator for the 
presence of the minister responsible for the campaign.
Frames constitute my unit of analysis. I operationalize substantive frames with the 
arguments that the two camps have produced to support their own position or to under-
mine the position of their adversaries. Frames and arguments are not entirely the same. 
Framing is the process by which political actors define the issue for their audience (e.g., 
Matthes, 2009; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997; Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997). A 
frame highlights some aspects of a perceived reality and enhances a certain interpreta-
tion or evaluation of reality (Entman, 1993). In this respect, a frame is more than a 
single argument because it also provides a specific understanding of the world. When I 
am referring to this defining function of a frame, I will use the term frame. By contrast, 
I will rely on the term arguments when I am concerned with the specific statement or 
with the number of arguments an article contains. In each document—press release, 
newspaper article, TV news program, and so forth—I coded all the arguments provided 
by or reported for each one of the relevant actors (organizations or their individual rep-
resentatives) in my study in great detail and then summarized them in a limited number 
of abstract categories (= frames), which I created on the basis of my reading of the 
controversy.5 For each side, the main frames are defined on the basis of the relative 
frequency in the media input.
I distinguish between two types of frames—contest frames and substantive frames. 
The unique feature of the contest frames is that they do not address the issue(s) at stake 
but focus on the actors involved or on the contest per se—on politics—whereas substan-
tive frames focus on the substantive contents of the debate—on policy. I will illustrate 
the coding of the substantive frames with an example: the “mass naturalization frame.” 
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I coded the following pro arguments (in favor of the proposition): “Mass naturalization 
has to be stopped”; “There are too many foreigners in Switzerland”; and “We should 
avoid naturalization of criminals or welfare recipients.” The contra arguments against 
the proposition included “The share of immigrants among the Swiss population is not 
excessively large” or “The number of naturalizations is not excessive.” I summarized 
these (and other) related arguments in a single frame, the mass naturalization frame.
Overall, almost 8,000 arguments were coded by eight different coders. Cohen’s 
Kappa for intercoder reliability was .61, which is not high, but acceptable. I consider 
it acceptable, because I carefully checked all the arguments after the coding and cor-
rected for coding errors and because, for the analysis, I summarized the detailed codes 
for arguments to broader categories (frames), which are less error-prone (Cohen’s 
Kappa = .87).
Data Analysis
I shall pursue a double strategy of data analysis and treat the campaign agenda both 
as a daily and an aggregate phenomenon. The purpose of such a double strategy is to 
find mutually reinforcing results. In the analysis of daily effects, I will use a zero-
inflated negative binominal regression model. Given that I am dealing with count 
data, the Poisson model is appropriate; however, given the overdispersion found in 
the data, I will use the negative binomial, a special version of the Poisson model that 
is adapted to this particular type of problem.6 When interpreting zero-inflated models, 
it is easy to be confused by the meaning of the effect parameters (the incidence-rate 
ratios). Such models have two parts—an inflation model and a count model. The 
inflation model estimates the effects (incidence-rate ratios) on the possibility that an 
argument does not make it into the media, that is, on the possibility of its absence 
from the media. The count model estimates the effects (incidence-rate ratios) on the 
frequency of an argument’s presence in the media. When the same independent vari-
ables are included in the equation for both models, the effects from the two models 
often point in opposite directions; that is, the one is smaller, the other larger than one. 
This makes sense from a substantive point of view. In the inflation model, a ratio 
smaller than one implies a smaller probability that a frame remains absent in the 
debate; that is, it implies that the influence factor increases the probability that the 
frame is nonabsent (= present) in the media. Correspondingly, in the count model, a 
ratio larger than one increases the frequency in the media. Because both presence and 
frequency are measured on a daily basis, I refer in this context to the daily frame 
presence and the daily frame frequency.
For the estimation of the model, I will use a stacked file, with four cases for each 
day, one for each of the main frame categories, plus one for the residual category. I 
shall introduce a dummy variable for each one of the main frames to control for their 
variable salience. To control for contemporaneous correlation, I will cluster the stan-
dard errors over time (= robust SE).7 I shall also lag the dependent variable by one day 
to control for the autoregressive effect. Zero-inflated models may be very sensitive to 
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the specification of the inflation model. It is therefore important to perform a sensitiv-
ity analysis (Long & Freese, 2006; Steenbergen, 2008).
In the time-series analysis of daily effects (see Table 1), I will study the lagged 
effects of power, salience of frames in media input, and minister status on the framing 
of the media. To do so, I can make use of the fact that political actors and the media do 
not communicate simultaneously, but in a stable morning-evening sequence in which 
the publication of (morning) newspapers precedes the events produced by the political 
actors during the day, which are in turn consistently followed by the broadcast of (eve-
ning) news bulletins and by the press of the next day. Lagging the key factors by one 
day (t – 1) provides the relevant influence factors for the framing of the press, whereas 
the framing of the political actors of the same day (t) provides the input for TV. The 
arguments from the newspaper and from TV were combined in the media variable.8
Results
Key Factors for Frame Presence and Frame Frequency
The results are presented in Table 1. First, let us look at the lower part of Table 1 
(inflation model). The lagged dependent variable (media [t – 1]) controls for serial 
correlation and for continuing frame attention in the dependent variable. Both lagged 
power ratios (power contra, power pro) are smaller than one. This means that power 
reduces the probability that a frame is absent in the news media. In other words, the 
Table 1.. Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression of Media Framing: Ratios, Robust 
Standard Errors, and p-Levels
Ratio Robust SE p
Count model(frequency)  
 Media (1) 1.018 0.013 .184
 Contra input (t – 1) 1.034 0.006 .000
 Pro input (t – 1) 1.071 0.034 .032
 Minister/president (t – 1) 2.969 1.287 .012
 Rule-of-law 3.076 0.586 .000
 People final say 2.690 0.446 .000
 Mass naturalization 2.285 0.380 .000
Inflation model(presence)  
 Media (t – 1) 0.141 0.642 .002
 Power contra (t – 1) 0.000 0.910 .000
 Power pro (t – 1) 0.947 0.015 .000
Constant 1.734 0.015 .000
N total = 364  
n zero observation = 190  
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more power the organizations presenting the arguments on a given camp on a given 
day have, the higher the chance that their argument will be covered (= present) in the 
media on the next day. All ratios are significant. This finding is also supported by the 
behavior of weak strategic actors: Weak actors join coalitions with powerful actors to 
increase the chance that their frames earn media coverage. Next, let us look at the 
upper part of Table 1, the count model (frequency). Overall, the lagged number of 
promoted frames of both camps and the lagged minister dummy significantly increase 
the daily frequency of the frame in the news media.
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of the number of promoted frames of both camps. It 
compares the percentage shares of the frames in the media input with the shares of the 
frames in the media’s news reporting. There are two graphs for each campaign—one 
with the shares of the contra camp (on the left) and one with the shares of the pro camp 
(on the right). The overall impression is that, in general, the news media rather faith-
fully reproduce the framing by the two camps. Thus, the percentage shares of the 
frames in the news media are generally similar to the shares found in the media input. 
There is one instance (the mass naturalization frame of the pro camp) where the news 
media increased the share of the main frames compared to the media input. This find-
ing is probably due to the advertisements: The pro camp was very active with adver-
tisements and focused on the respective frames in the ads (Hänggli, 2011).
Table 2 gives a more detailed overview of the frames in the media input and in the 
news media of the campaign. Compared to Figure 1, it reports the “others” and the 
“contest” frames. The media input corresponds to what has been shown by Hänggli 
and Kriesi (2011). Compared to the media input, there are few differences in the 
media’s news reporting. First, the media made no special effort with their own or other 
frames (also see Gerth & Siegert, 2011). Second, as one might also have expected on 
the basis of the American and British experience, the media rely more heavily on con-
test frames in their news reporting. However, even in their case, substantive frames 
largely predominate. Thus, we can state that in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns, 
framing is primarily conducted in substantive terms.
Next, we go back to Table 1. In both count and inflation models, the lagged depen-
dent variable (media [t – 1]) controls for serial correlation. The significant ratio in the 
inflation model (presence) is smaller than one, which means that the frames in the 
news media reduce the probability of a zero count on the following day. In other 
words, the media also writes about the campaign independently of the explicit input of 
the two camps. It has established its own routines for how to deal with a direct- 
democratic campaign. As is shown by the panels in Figure 2, which present the daily 
development of the media coverage of the two camps, these routines imply a “critical 
period” of press coverage towards the end of the campaign, when the citizens have 
received their voting material and are doing their voting (mainly by mail). Furthermore, 
external events structure the debate. The first 100 days of Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf 
in office as a minister clearly structured the campaign. Only when this first 100 days 
had passed in the 8th week before the vote did the campaign and media coverage about 
this issue start. Finally, in Figure 2 we see patterns that look like “mountains”: When 
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the core frame is covered, the second frame and the opponents’ core frame are covered 
as well and vice versa. The patterns look similar when looking at media input (not 
shown here). This supports the idea that in direct-democratic campaigns the salience 
with which a frame is promoted is not important for frame presence because media 
coverage is not restricted to the most important frame. By contrast, it further supports 
the idea that the salience is relevant for frame frequency because the pattern look so 
similar in media.
Table 3 shows the predicted change in the news media counts depending on a 
change from the minimum to the maximum value in the key factors. We can see that 
the counts are most sensitive to the salience of a frame in media input and the minis-
ter’s presence, whereas the predicted change based on a change of power is relatively 
small. There are two reasons for the significant but negligible small effect of power of 
Contra Camp Pro Camp
0
10
20
30
40
50
media input
news media
0
10
20
30
40
50
media input
news media
Figure 1. Comparison between the percentage shares of the frames in the media input and 
in the news media
Table 2. Substantive and Contest Frames of the Two Camps in the Media Input and the 
News Media: Percentages
Media input News media
 Con Pro Con Pro
Substantive frames  
 Rule-of-law 49.1 19.6 46.7 18.7
 People final say 21.9 39.3 18.4 32.5
 Mass naturalization 17.4 20.6 11.2 26.2
 Others  5.1  7.4  7.3  5.9
 All substantive frames 93.5 86.9 83.5 83.3
Contest frames 6.5 13.1 16.5 16.7
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
N 675 107 1,248 766
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the pro camp. First, only two actors were involved on the pro side. One of them pro-
duced 75% of all frames, meaning that there is almost no variation in the power vari-
able. In addition, the pro camp only promoted few arguments; that is, 94% of the 
counts are zero counts, because for most of the time, no frame was promoted.
Conclusion
My analysis confirms that the input of the political actors plays a decisive role in direct-
democratic campaigns. With regard to the daily frame presence, the campaign-specific 
power of a political organization is important. This result lends strong support to the 
0
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0
15 10 5 0
weeks before vote
core argument contra core argument pro
2nd argument pro
Contra Camp: Arguments in Media Coverage
0
50
10
0
15
0
15 10 5 0
weeks before vote
core argument contra core argument pro
2nd argument pro
Pro Camp: Arguments in Media Coverage 
Figure 2. The development of the campaign on a weekly basis—by camp and campaign: 
Absolute counts of substantive frames
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power bias hypothesis. To reiterate, the “power bias hypothesis” predicts that powerful 
organizations have a higher chance of finding access to the media news. In line with 
the salience hypothesis, the media report the frames proportionally to the degree to 
which they are promoted (= frequency with which they are mentioned in the media 
input). Thus, the number of promoted frames is crucial for frame frequency. The min-
ister plays also an influential role for the daily frame frequency. The minister’s frames 
are met with higher response by the media than the messages of the other actors (mul-
tiplication hypothesis). Finally, external events can moderate the influence of frame 
building.
The question is what the results imply for the quality of direct-democratic debates. 
Overall, the findings correspond to the criteria of the representative liberal theory (Ferree 
et al., 2002, p. 206). This elitist stance accepts that general public participation in the 
public sphere is largely indirect and limited. From this perspective, elite dominance is an 
important criterion for good public discourse. It means that powerful actors should earn 
voice in the media. In addition, the content of public discourse should be a free market-
place of ideas, which suggests that there should be no restrictions on content. The find-
ing that the share of media frames is proportional to the share of frames in the media 
input indicates that we have such a marketplace in direct-democratic debates. The civil-
ity criterion claims that contest frames, indeed, should be rare. Finally, the norm of clo-
sure is about the idea that the debate can be decided. This criterion is also met in 
direct-democratic campaigns. Alternatively, we can link the findings to the watchdog 
norm (Bro, 2008). In this view, journalists are passive, that is, they focus on disseminat-
ing news stories and not on attempting to prompt a certain behavior. In addition, news 
reporting has a representative focus instead of a deliberative one. It anticipates that news 
media focus more on powerful figures than on citizens.
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Table 3. Predicted Change in the News Media Counts
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remaining variables were set at the mean or at zero (minister/president [t – 1]), and the main frame of 
the respective camp was used.
 at University of Zurich on January 25, 2012abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Hänggli 15
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship and/or publication 
of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research and/or author-
ship of this article: This work is based on research done in NCCR Democracy and funded by 
the Swiss National Science Foundation.
Notes
 1. See also Hall (1973).
 2. Direct-democratic procedures have been shown to increase the media standing of actors 
who are notoriously weak, such as social movement organizations or the political parties 
(Höglinger, 2008). However, whereas outsiders might find more standing in the media due 
to direct-democratic instruments, I expect that their influence on the content of the debate 
(i.e., on frame building) is restricted because they still have difficulties bringing their mes-
sage into media coverage.
 3. The Swiss-German media include Neue Zürcher Zeitung, NZZ am Sonntag, Sonntagszeitung 
(elite), Tagesanzeiger, Aargauer Zeitung, Basler Zeitung, Berner Zeitung, Neue Luzerner 
Zeitung, Die Südostschweiz, St. Galler Tagblatt, Sonntag (AZ), Die Südostschweiz am 
Sonntag (regional), 20 Minuten, Punkt CH (free), Blick, Sonntagsblick (tabloid), Tagesschau 
(TV). The French-speaking media include Le Temps (quality), Tribune de Genève, 24 heu-
res (regional), 20 Minutes (free), Le Matin, Le Matin Dimanche (tabloid), journal (TV). I 
did not analyze the media from the small Italian-speaking part of the country.
 4. Governmental actors are excluded because they are expected not to campaign.
 5. The codebook is available from the author upon request.
 6. Overdispersion implies the presence of greater variability (statistical dispersion) in the predicted 
counts for a given value of x than would be expected based on the Poisson regression model. 
STATA provides a likelihood-ratio test for overdispersion. In addition, due to the excess zeros 
in the data, also called zero inflation, a zero-inflated count model is necessary. Greene (2000) 
has proposed the Vuong (1989) test for nonnested models to establish whether a zero-inflated 
model is necessary. Zero-inflated count models assume that there are two latent (i.e. unobserved) 
groups—an “always zero” and a “not always zero” group—and that zero counts are generated by 
two independently operating processes. In the first process (inflation model), the zeros belonging 
to the “always zero” group are generated. An argument in this group has an outcome of zero with 
a probability of one. This process is binary; it generates zeros or ones. If this first process results 
in one, the second process is assumed to come into play: a negative binominal regression process 
(count model) that generates zeros of the “not always” group. An argument in this group might 
have a zero count, but there is a nonzero probability that it has a positive count.
 7. This correction was designed for linear models, and it is not completely clear whether it 
works as well for this kind of model. However, the results are also robust without the clus-
tering with the exception of the contra camp’s power.
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 8. I will use the following abbreviations for the variables: media (t – 1) is the number of argu-
ments reported in the media on day t – 1. Contra (t – 1) and pro (t – 1) is the number of 
arguments presented as input material by the pro and the contra camps, respectively, on day 
(t – 1). Minister (t – 1) is the minister dummy of day t – 1. Power contra (t – 1) and power 
pro (t – 1) are the sum of daily power of the respective camp. Rule-of-law, people final say, 
and mass naturalization are dummy indicators for the three main framing categories, with 
the residual category (“others”) forming the reference category.
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